Pure reason, Kant claims," being present and remains identical in all acts of the person at all adverbial modifiers of time, but it is not in time and does not get, for example a new state in which it not to a nakhodilsyaransha, it defines a state, but the pure reason is not defined by it" Therefore there is no phenomenon, he is not subordinated what - or to sensuality conditions. Freedom is generation of pure reason, a consequence of ability inherent in it "spontaneously to begin a number of events" It is about empirical events which are caused by an aprioristic polaganiye of pure reason i.e. regardless of empiricheskimobstoyatelstvo.
We see. that Kant extremely points statement of a problem of freedom. The human being appears in a situation which in any case at first sight, rpedstavlyatsya unreal, impossible. The person is free, Kant, only as transcendental "transcendental object" from what, apparently, follows claims that in all the empirical, real life it is not free. Such conclusion would be correct if Kant was limited to only one opposition of the phenomena and "transcendental objects", real and otherworldly. Actually Kant to a certain extent removes, overcomes this opposition as, according to its doctrine, the person a reasonable being, i.e. in that measure in what he acts reasonably, being within empirical circumstances, represents not only the phenomenon, but freely operating "transcendental object".
Identity of free will with moral act - one of the most important provisions of transcendental idealism of Kant. The concept of pure reason - the basic in this system - immanently comprises idea of free will as good will. However such statement of a problem sovbodno generates considerable difficulties which Kant constantly meets.